Abstract. This paper investigates the relative importance of Islamic banks, alongside their conventional counterparts, in relation tobanking and financial development and economic welfare. Using a sample of 22 Muslim countries, with dual-banking systems, during the period 1999-2011, this paper reports some significant positive relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and the development of financial intermediation, financial deepening and economic welfare, particularly in low income or predominantly Muslim countries,and countries with a comparatively higher uncertainty avoidance index.
Introduction
Financial systems mitigate information and transaction costs. The core functions of financial markets and institutions are to facilitate savings mobilization, informationacquisition and processing, theefficient allocation of funds and to encourage effectivecorporate governance (Levine, 1997) . Awell-functioning financial market and efficient financial intermediation can spur capital productivity and foster economic growth (Rousseau and Sylla, 1999; Beck, et al., 2000 and Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Levine, 2005 among others) .
The extant literature discusses the importance of how differently shaped financial systems can affect economic development (e.g. Levine et al., 2000; Beck and Levine, 2004; Merton and Bodie, 2004 and . Differences in banking industry structures can also differently impact the economy as a whole. For instance, Their findings suggest that where small, private, domestically-owned banks have larger market shares and higher efficiency,this can boost economic growth. In this paper we study whether the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banking contributes to financial development and economic welfare.
According to The Banker (2013), Islamic finance is growing at the rate of 15% to 20% per annum. Globally, Islamic banking assets in commercial banks are set to exceed $1.7 trillion in 2013 (Ernst & Young, 2013 -2014 .
The empirical work in this area has grown accordingly. The extant literature analyzes various features of Islamic banking and finance: investment financing (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000) , securitization (Jobst, 2007) , mortgage loans (Ebrahim, 2009) , stability (Čihák and Hesse, 2010) , relationship banking (Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü, 2011 ), business models (Beck et al., 2013) , risk (Abedifar, et al., 2013) , efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2014) , loan default rates (Baele et al., 2014) , mutual funds and valuation (Elnahass, et al., 2014) 1 .
However, there are few studies on the role and relative importance of Islamic banking in the transformation of the banking and finance sectors of respective countries. Using a sample of 20 Muslim countries for the period, Gheeraert (2014 shows that development of Islamic banking sector boosts the whole banking system. Gheeraert and Weill (2014) claim that the development of Islamic banking improves macroeconomic efficiency. Islamic banking has changed the financial structure of many countries by introducing a dual financial system in which both Islamic and conventional institutions operate. This paper attempts to fill the void by investigating the characteristics of Islamic banking from the finance-growth perspective.
Islamic banks offer financial products and services that are compatible with Islamic doctrine,which allows Muslim individuals and firms with religious concerns to have access to finance or move from an informal to a formal financial system. In short, Islamic banks can mitigate financial exclusion and bring financial services to a wider population. This can also promote better strategiesfor poverty alleviation (Rajan, 2006) .
Changes in market structure may affect banks' performance. In a dual-banking system, Islamic and conventional banks do not merely play a supplementary role to one another, they compete with each other for clients and investors. Whether and how conventional banks are affected by the presence of Islamic banks is an important issue from the policy-making perspective and we examine how the efficiency of conventional banks is affected when they operate alongside Islamic banks.
We focus on commercial banking industries in 22 Muslim countries with dualbanking systems during the 1999-2011 period. Overall, we find that the effect of a dual-banking system (where Islamic banks operate alongside their conventional counterparts) on financial development, economic growth and poverty alleviation depends on the institutional environment.Thisis examined in our study from three perspectives: religion, wealth and culture. Our results show that a higher market share of medium-size Islamic banks is associated with: greater funding mobilization and credit allocation, economic growth and poverty alleviation in countries with relatively greater proportions of Muslims in their populations; countries with a comparatively higher uncertainty avoidance index;and countries with lower GDP per capita. Our bank-level analyses reveal a positive relationship between the presence of large Islamic banks and the efficiency of conventional banks in predominantly Muslim countries.In more religiously diverse Muslim countries, the efficiency of conventional banks is positively linked to the market share of conventional banks with
Islamic window/branches.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research motivation and econometric specifications, section 3 describes our sample of observations, and section 4 discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Research Motivation and Econometric Specifications

FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC WELFARE
We study the relationship between the coexistence of Islamic banks and conventional banks and national financial development in terms of savings mobilization and funds allocation. We also explore the link between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth, income inequality, and poverty alleviation.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Many Muslims do not use traditional financial products and services, because they believe these conflict with their religious beliefs. They may use financial services provided by the informal market. 2 A number of surveys highlight that Muslims prefer Sharia-compliant financial products and services. In Algeria, for instance, a study shows that around 20.7% of micro-enterprise owners do not apply for loans primarily due to religious concerns (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 2006) . In Indonesia, around 49% of the rural population of East Java prefers Islamic finance and believes that interest is prohibited (C.G.A.P., 2008).
Honohan (2008) finds that in member countries of the Islamic Development Bank (i.e., all OIC 3 -member countries except Guyana) only 28 percent of the total adult population uses formal or semi-formal financial products and services for deposit and borrowing activities.
Given the relatively low access to financial institutions and products in most Muslim countries (e.g. Honohan, 2008) , there is considerable potential for Islamic finance, by moving lenders and borrowers from the informal to formal markets. 4 Hence, Islamic banks are expected to play a complementary role to conventional banks in intermediating financial resources.Islamic and conventional banking may also substitute for each other; for example, Islamic banks can absorb lenders and borrowers from conventional financial institutions. We therefore explore whether the presence of Islamic banks can increasefinancial intermediation.
First, we investigate how the deposits in the banking industry and financial system are affected by the presence of Islamic banks.We then examine the relationship between the volume of private credit and the market share of Islamic banks.
Economic Growth
Whether the presence of Islamic banks can affect economic growth is an empirical question that we attempt to address in this study. Existing studies show that religious individuals are more risk-averse than other agents (Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Osoba, 2003; Hilary and Hui, 2009) . Similarly, Islamic financial institutions might be more risk-averse than their conventional counterparts. Therefore, they might limit entrepreneurship by encouraging borrowers to select low-risk projects or to invest excessively in tangible assets. Furthermore, Islamic financiers may prefer to allocate funds to the real economy, becausethey are not authorized to allocate financial resources to speculative activities.
INCOME INEQUALITY and POVERTY ALLEVIATION
A profit-maximization strategy encourages financial institutions to establish branches and networks in large cities or capital-oriented areas rather than in areas with low population density or low income. This may leave the poor withrelatively limited access to financial products and services such as deposits and loans. Additionally, some poor Muslims may prefer to bank with Sharia-compliant financial institutions. The lack of access to finance can exacerbate poverty (Ayyagari et al, 2008) . The limited access of the poor to finance is addressed by the microfinance literature (see Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005 among others),where governments might be encouraged to promote financial services in rural and low income areas. The government of India, for instance, adopted a policy, during the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , to support the opening bank branches in areas without any bank 5 .Thatpolicy has been associated with a 60% reduction in rural poverty (Burgess and Pande, 2005) . 5 The government allowed establishment of a new branch in districts that had already benefited from bank presence provided that the bank opened four branches in areas without bank presence. Rajan (2006) argues that it is better to focus on finance for all rather than to focus exclusively on the poor. This is more practical from the political economy perspective 6 and a number of empirical studies show that the poor also benefits from a more generalpolicy.
Honohan (2004) finds a negative relationship between financial development and headcount ratio. Beck et al. (2007) claim that financial deepening not only has a positive effect on economic growth, but it also mitigates income inequality and reduces poverty.
Islam, like other Abrahamic religions (Judaism and Christianity), encourages lending that it is free of interest. The motivation for the prohibition of interest is to prevent the oppression of the poor. Hence, the availability of Islamic finance may lessen income inequality and alleviate poverty, given thatIslamic financial institutions may incorporate poverty alleviation in their business strategies. They are expected to have a greater incentive to offer financial products and services to poor clients. We therefore expect to find that Islamic financiers contribute more to social and development activities than their conventional counterparts.
Alternatively, Islamic financial institutions may offer Sharia-compliant financial products and services as part of a marketing strategy to attract clients that are highly religious. They might also follow a profit-maximization approach similar to conventional financial institutions 7 , so that there would be few differences between Islamic and conventional products. Hence, Islamic financial institutions may not be more effective in reducing poverty than conventional financial institutions,so it is important to investigate the impact of Islamic financial institutions on income inequality and poverty.
6 For instance, microfinance is well practiced only in a few countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and Thailand (Honohan, 2004) . 7 We follow existing literature (see e.g. Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000 Chong and Liu, 2009; Beck et al, 2013 and Abedifar et al, 2013) and assume that Islamic commercial banks follow a profit maximization strategy similar to conventional commercial banks within the constraints imposed by Sharia, e.g. prohibition of interest-based financial activities.
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS
We adopt the following panel specification for our analyses. To control for individual unobservable heterogeneity across countries, we use the fixed-effect technique in our estimation and cluster standard errors at the country level.
Y j,t = α 0 + α 11 ×Small_ISB_Share j,t + α 12 ×Medium_ISB_Share j,t + α 13 ×Large_ISB_Share j,t + α 21 ×Small_ISW_Share j,t + α 22 ×Medium_ISW_Share j,t + α 23 ×Large_ISW_Share j,t + α 3 ×Foreign_Banks_Share j,t + α 4 ×State_Banks_Share j,t + α 5 ×Inflation j,t + α 6 ×Per_Capita j,t + α 7 ×Remittance_Inflow j,t + α 8 ×Trend t + ε j,t (1)
Where j subscript denotes individual countries and t denotes the time dimension.
Y j,t is our dependent variable. We use the following three proxies for our financialintermediation study: total deposits of commercial banks to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio (Bank Deposit); total deposits in the financial system to GDP ratio (Financial System Deposit) representing the volume of deposits mobilization; and the ratio of private credit to GDP (Private Credit) as a proxy for credit allocation.
For our economic growth analysis, we employ the annual growth rate of GDP per capita, calculated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) method (Economic Growth) as the dependent variable (Y j,t ).
We explore income inequality and poverty alleviation using five proxies: the Gini Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Delis and Kouretas, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2013) . On one hand, banks have a greater risktaking appetite when interest rates are low.On the other hand, an increase in interest rates can adversely affect borrowers' ability to repay loans (Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000; Carling et al., 2007; Drehmann et al., 2010; and Alessandri and Drehmann, 2010) . Finally, we try to capture the possible impact of income level and growth by including GDP per capita (Per Capita) and growth in GDP per capita (Per Capita Growth).
We also control for bank-level heterogeneities. We include the share of equity capital in total assets (Capital). On one hand, an increase in equity can lower moral-hazard problems and increase banks' monitoring incentives (Berger et al., 1995,) . On the other hand, higher equity can increase banks' risk-taking capacity. Equity capital can be considered a riskaversion proxy (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Koetter and Noth, 2013) and banks with higher capital ratios expect higher returns. Jensen (1986) and Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that when capital is more expensive than debt (at the margin), management might reduce operating costs to offset the higher costs of the increase in capital required by regulators. Alternatively, lower interest expense may weaken attempts to control operating expenses. Therefore, the impact of capital on efficiency is unclear.
We consider the effect of size in our study by using the logarithm of total assets (Size)
as the proxy. Larger banks can benefit from scale economies and diversification (Hughes et al., 2001) . They may target riskier activities where there is a benefit from safety-net subsidies (Kane, 2010) . Higher competition pressure might arise where they have larger and more transparent clients with relatively easier access to capital markets. Larger banks may also use different technologies and business models for their operations. Thus, bank efficiency might varyacross banks ofdifferent size.We also take into account credit risk as represented by nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio (Credit Risk): a bank thatdoes not efficiently monitor its loan activities, is unlikely to be efficient in its operations (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
Finally, we capture year fixed effects using twelve year-dummy variables. 10 The sample covers 13 years; however, however, we drop one year-dummy to avoid perfect multicolinearity and use twelve year-dummies in our estimations. 11 Among 57 Muslim countries (i.e. OIC-member countries), we find Islamic commercial banking in 24 countries. In the following 22 Muslim countries Islamic and conventional commercial banks operate alongside each other (they have a dual-banking system): Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In Iran and Sudan, the commercial banking system is fully Islamic. Table A3 illustrates the pair-wise correlations, which do not show any high correlations between these three sub-samples of countries 13 .
Empirical Results
ISLAMIC BANKING IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES
We explore the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and the financial development and economic welfare for the sample of Predominantly Muslim Countries.We estimate Equation (1) In columns (4) to (9), we explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and economic welfare (i.e. economic growth, income inequality and poverty alleviation). In column (4) In columns (6) to (9), we examine the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and our proxies for poverty (Poverty Ratio International, Poverty Ratio National, Poverty Gap International and Poverty Ratio Rural) . Our analyses show a negative association ofMedium ISB Sharewith Poverty Ratio National(poverty ratio defined based on national poverty line)and also Poverty Ratio Rural (poverty ration in the rural area).
Overall, we find that an increase in market share of MediumIslamic banks in PredominantlyMuslim Countriesisassociated with a higher funding mobilization and credit allocation, but lower income inequality, percentage of population below the national poverty line and headcount ratio in rural area. We carry out similar analysesfor More Religiously Diverse Countries and find no significant relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and our proxies for financial development and economic welfare (except for the negative link between Medium ISB Shareand Private Credit) 14 .
[ As a robustness check, we re-estimate our model using GMM panel estimation technique and find similar results 15 . Table 3 illustrates the estimation of Equation (1) In columns (4) to (9), we explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and economic growth, income inequality and poverty. The results show that a higher market share of Medium size Islamic banks is associated with higher Economic Growth, a lower percentage of people below the international poverty line (Poverty Ratio International), lower poverty intensity (Poverty Gap International) and a lower headcount ratio in the rural area (Poverty Ratio Rural). However, we find almost no associationbetween our proxy for income inequality (i.e. Gini) and the market share of Islamic banks.
ISLAMIC BANKING IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES
Overall, we find that the presence of Islamic banks is positively linked with financial sector development, economic growth and poverty alleviation in Low Income Countries.
14 The results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.
15
The results are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 16 Since we make sub-samples of countries based on Per Capita, we exclude the variable Per Capita from our model in this sub-section.
[ Table 4 illustrates the estimation of Equation (1) In columns (4) and (5), we find no significant relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth and our income inequality index. We explore the relationship between the market share of Islamic banks and poverty indices in columns (6) to (9). We find a negative associationofMedium ISB Sharewiththe percentage of the population below the national poverty line (Poverty Ratio National) and also headcount ratio in the rural area (Poverty Ratio Rural).
Overall, we find that the market share of Medium size Islamic banks is positively linked with financial sector development. We also find some evidence,which suggests that the growth of Islamic banking is associated with poverty alleviation particularly in rural areas. As a further robustness check, we exclude Lebanon as it suffered from civil war during our period of study and investigate whether the findings still hold. The results indicate no significant change 17 .
[ 
ISLAMIC BANKING BEFORE AND AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
We investigate whether and how our findings change when we exclude the global financial crisis of 2007-08 from our analysis. We consider two sub-periods for Predominantly Muslim
Countries: the period before the global financial crisis (i.e. 1999-2007) and during the global recession thereafter (2008-2012 18 ). The results are presented in Table A5 of the appendix. We
give our estimatesof the model (Equation (1)) for the two periods: columns (1) to (4) and (5) to ( In the recession period, we find that the market share of Small Islamic banks is positively associated with funds mobilization and credit allocation, whereas Large ISB Shareshowsa negative link with our proxies for financial development. The estimations show no significant link between the presence of Islamic banks and economic growth.
EFFICIENCY OF CONVENTIONAL BANKS
We estimate Equation (2) using the ratio of total noninterest expense to total operating income (Inefficiency) as the proxy. We estimate our model for More Religiously Diverse
CountriesandPredominantly Muslim Countries subsamples. Table 5 presents the estimations.
Columns (1) to (4) 
Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the presence of Islamic commercial banks and their conventional counterparts in the same market can foster the development of the overall commercial banking sector and economic welfare. We also explore the possible implications for conventional banks operating in a dual-banking system.
During recent decades, as Islamic banking has grown in many Muslim countries, a dual-banking system has emerged in which both Islamic and conventional banks share the market. Islamic financial institutions offer Sharia-compatible financial products and services.This could have lessened the potential for financial exclusion, by reaching out to Muslims who avoid conventional borrowing and lending instruments.
Islamic banks behave differently from their conventional counterparts in several ways. Specifically, they are not authorized to engage with speculative activities. They must act as agents of their investment accountholders by allocating their savings to profitable projects. They tend tobe more risk-averse and have a stronger preference for investing in the real economy. Moreover, the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banking could increase the efficiency of the whole banking system by improving competition.
We study 22 Muslim countries with a dual-banking system during the 1999-2011
period. Due to considerable heterogeneity,we split the countries into two subsamples based on three factors: the share of the Muslims in population, population's wealth and culture.
We find that the market share of medium-size Islamic banks in predominantly Muslim countries is positively linked with funds mobilization and private credit allocation, and negatively linked with income inequality, percentage of population below the national poverty line and headcount ratio in the rural area.The analysis of relatively low income countries shows that the presence of medium-size Islamic banks is associated with a higher level of funds mobilization, economic growth and poverty alleviation. In countries with a relatively high uncertainty avoidance index, medium-size Islamic banks have a positive relationship with funds mobilization and private credit allocation and a negative association with headcount ratio based on national poverty line and poverty ratio in rural area.
We also investigate the relationship between the presence of Islamic banks and the efficiency of conventional banks. We find that the market share of large Islamic banks is positively linked with the efficiency of conventional banks in predominantly Muslim countries. However, in more religiously diverse Muslim countries, the market share of conventional banks with Islamic window/branches is positively linked to the efficiency of purely conventional banks.
Overall, the results are consistent with the view that the presence of Islamic banks can foster access to finance and financial deepening, and improve economic welfare particularly in countries with a predominantly Muslim population,higher uncertainty avoidance index and acomparatively low GDP per capita. The findings are in line with the existing literature onfinance and development. 
Appendices
Variables Description Source
Commercial Bank Structure
Small ISB Share Small Islamic banks' assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Small Islamic banks are Islamic banks with total assets below $100 million.
Bankscope and banks' websites.
Medium ISB Share
Medium Islamic banks' assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Medium Islamic banks are Islamic banks with total assets above $100 million and below $1 billion.
Large ISB Share
Large Islamic banks' assets as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Large Islamic banks are Islamic banks with total assets above $1 billion.
Small ISW Share
Total assets of small commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Small commercial banks are banks with total assets below $100 million.
Medium ISW Share
Total assets of medium-size commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Medium-size commercial banks are banks with total assets above $100 million and below $1 billion.
Large ISW Share
Total assets of large commercial banks offering both Islamic and conventional products as a percentage of total assets of all commercial banks. Large commercial banks are banks with total assets above $1 billion.
Foreign Banks Share
Foreign-owned bank assets as a percentage of total assets of commercial banks. Bankscope and banks' websites.
State Banks Share
State-owned bank assets as a percentage of total assets of commercial banks. Bankscope and banks' websites.
HHI
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration:
. It has a value between 0 and 100. Higher values indicate that the market is more concentrated.
Funding Mobilization and Allocation
Bank Deposit
The ratio of commercial bank deposits to GDP. The World Bank website.
Financial System Deposit
The ratio of financial system deposits to GDP. The World Bank website.
Private Credit
The ratio of private credit to GDP. The World Bank website.
Economic Growth, Income Inequality & Poverty Index
Economic Growth
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita. The World Bank website.
Gini
The Gini coefficient used as a measure of income inequality. The World Bank website.
Poverty Ratio International
Percentage of population below the international poverty line defined as $1.25 a day (PPP). The World Bank website.
Poverty Ratio National
Percentage of population below the national poverty line. The World Bank website.
Poverty Gap
The intensity of poverty at the international poverty line. The World Bank website.
Poverty Ratio Rural
Percentage of rural population below the rural poverty line. The World Bank website.
Other Country Level Heterogeneities
Muslim 
Domestic Interest Rate
Deposit interest rate provided by the World Bank website; for years and countries with missing observations, the data is obtained from the central bank websites.
The World Bank website and the websites of central banks.
Bank-Level Analysis
Inefficiency
The ratio of total noninterest expense to total operating revenue. Bankscope
Size
The logarithm of total assets. Bankscope
Capital
The ratio of equity capital to asset. Bankscope
Credit Risk
The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Bankscope Y j,t = α 0 + α 11 ×Small_ISB_Share j,t + α 12 ×Medium_ISB_Share j,t + α 13 ×Large_ISB_Share j,t + α 21 ×Small_ISW_Share j,t + α 22 ×Medium_ISW_Share j,t + α 23 ×Large_ISW_Share j,t + α 3 ×Foreign_Banks_Share j,t + α 4 ×State_Banks_Share j,t + α 5 ×Inflation j,t + α 6 ×Per_Capita j,t + α 7 ×Remittance_Inflow j,t + α 8 ×Trend t + ε j,t
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median proportion of Inflation. Countries above the median value are classified in one group (High Inflation Countries). The median value is 7.09%.
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income inequality and poverty index.
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See Y j,t = α 0 + α 11 ×Small_ISB_Share j,t + α 12 ×Medium_ISB_Share j,t + α 13 ×Large_ISB_Share j,t + α 21 ×Small_ISW_Share j,t + α 22 ×Medium_ISW_Share j,t + α 23 ×Large_ISW_Share j,t + α 3 ×Foreign_Banks_Share j,t + α 4 ×State_Banks_Share j,t + α 5 ×Inflation j,t + α 6 ×Per_Capita j,t + α 7 ×Remittance_Inflow j,t + α 8 ×Trend t + ε j,t
We split our sample our sample of Predominantly Muslim Countries into two groups. The analysis of the period before the global financial crisis, i.e. 1999-2007, is presented in columns (1) to (4). Columns (5) to (8) We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, Medium ISB Share and Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation (represented by Bank Deposit, Financial System Deposit and Private Credit). Column (4) illustrates the estimation for economic growth. Columns (5) to (8) (1) to (4).
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median proportion of Muslims in a country's population. Countries above the median value are classified in one group (PredominantlyMuslim Countries). The median value is 95%.
We regress our dependent variables on our variable of interest (i.e., Small ISB Share, MediumISB Shareand Large ISB Share) and control variables. In columns (1) to (3), we study the relationship between our variables of interest and development of financial intermediation. Columns (4) to (9) present our analysis for economic growth, income inequality and poverty index.
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of countries' Per Capita. Countries below the median value are classified in one group (called Low Income Countries). The median value is about $ 6,300.
We split our sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of countries' uncertainty avoidance index. Countries below the median value are classified in one group (called High Uncertainty Avoidance Countries). The median value is 68.
We employ the fixed-effect technique for our estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. See 
